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Abstract: Privacy amplification is an indispensable step in postprocessing of continuous-variable
quantum key distribution (CV-QKD), which is used to distill unconditional secure keys from identical
corrected keys between two distant legal parties. The processing speed of privacy amplification has
a significant effect on the secret key rate of CV-QKD system. We report the high-speed parallel
implementation of length-compatible privacy amplification algorithm based on graphic processing unit.
Length-compatible algorithm is used to satisfy the security requirement of privacy amplification at
different transmission distances when considering finite-size effect. We achieve the speed of privacy
amplification over 1 Gbps at arbitrary input length and the speed is one to two orders of magni-
tude faster than previous demonstrations, which supports high-speed real-time CV-QKD system and
ensures the security of privacy amplification.
Index Terms: Privacy amplification, continuous-variable quantum key distribution, length-compatible,
graphic processing unit, finite-size effect.
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] is one of the most practical quantum information technologies,
which allows two distant legitimate parties named Alice and Bob to generate unconditional security
keys despite the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. According to the encode mode of key infor-
mation, there are mainly two kinds of QKD systems: the systems that encode key information on
discrete-variable (DV) [2], [3] and the systems that encode key information on continuous-variable
(CV) [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. We focus on CV-QKD system because it has the advantage of using
standard telecommunication technologies [9], [10], [11], [12]. A practical CV-QKD system includes
two parts: quantum communication and classical communication. In the first part, the sender Alice
prepares quantum states and sends them to receiver Bob though an non-trusted quantum channel
which can be eavesdropped by Eve, then Bob measures the quantum states by homodyne or
heterodyne detector. Generally, the second part is the postprocessing of CV-QKD systems, which
mainly contains sifting, parameter estimation [13], [14], information reconciliation [15], [16], [17]
and privacy amplification [18], [19], [20], and it is implemented though a classical authenticated
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channel.
Privacy amplification is an indispensable step in postprocessing, which is used to distill the final
secret keys from the identical corrected keys between Alice and Bob. This process is implemented
by using universal Hash families which can be used to compress keys [21], [22]. Toeplitz matrix
is one of universal hash families [23]. Its structure is simple and can be implemented in parallel.
For high speed real-time CV-QKD system, the implementation speed of privacy amplification is
one of the limitations. Some approaches can be used to speed up the process based on software
implementation, such as fast Fourier transform (FFT) and number theoretic transform [24]. There
are some other methods have been used to accelerate the process. In Ref. [25], they use four
basic multiplication algorithms at different input length to achieve a fast implementation. In addition
to software implementation, this process can also be implemented with hardware, such as field-
programmable gate arrays (FPGA) [26].
Currently, the main bottleneck of CV-QKD system is the postprocessing of information, especially
in high efficiency and high speed real-time security implementation, and it highly affects the secret
key rate and transmission distance of CV-QKD systems [27], [28]. We achieve high efficiency by
combining multidimensional reconciliation [29] and multi-edge type low density parity check codes
(MET-LDPC) [30]. However, the MET-LDPC codes require long block length (on the order of 106),
large iteration numbers and soft-decision decoding algorithm to correct errors at low signal-to-noise
ratios [16]. Generally, it is more suitable for software implementation which has the advantages
of big memory and high floating-point precision compare to hardware-based decoder. We obtain
high error correction speed for CV-QKD system based on graphic processing unit (GPU), because
it provides parallel computation and is suitable for processing floating-point information [17]. To
obtain high speed real-time CV-QKD systems and simplify the postprocessing operations, we still
implement high speed privacy amplification on GPU. Due to the high computational complexity
of matrix multiplication, we convert the matrix multiplication into polynomial multiplication and
accelerate it with FFT which reduces the computational complexity from O(n2) to O(nlog2n).
Furthermore, the input length of privacy amplification is required to be large enough to ensure
the security of CV-QKD systems when considering the finite-size effect [13], [31]. Normally, the
input length increases as the transmission distance increases when the security parameter is
fixed. The security parameter represents the failure probability of the system, which means that
the eavesdropper Eve can get the secret keys with a probability no large than the value of
the security parameter. Typically, it is fixed to 10−10. Practically, when the transmission distance
are about 50km, 80km, and 100km, the input length are respectively the order of 108, 109, and
1010 [10], [12]. However, the computational power of common computers is limited by memory size
or other factors, and can not perform long-input-block-length privacy amplification directly. Thus,
we propose a length-compatible method to satisfy the length requirement of different transmission
distance. This method is implemented by dividing the long input length into short block length,
and then performing the privacy amplification separately, finally merging the corresponding results
together. The correctness of FFT results is related to the input length and computational precision.
With the increase of input length, the required computational precision of FFT increases as well.
Otherwise, the results will be wrong and the privacy amplification will fail. And the higher the
precision, the slower the speed. To solve this problem, we separate the long input length into
short block length which can be correctly calculated at low precision. Meanwhile, in order to make
full use of the computing and memory resources of GPU and further accelerate the speed of
privacy amplification, the short blocks can be calculated in parallel by setting batches.
In this paper, we propose a high speed implementation method of length-compatible privacy
amplification for CV-QKD system. The early stage of this work has been applied to the longest
field test of a high speed real time CV-QKD system and we further improve it in this work [12].
The principe of privacy amplification for CV-QKD system is described in Section 2. In Section
3, we present the high speed implementation method of length-compatible privacy amplification
based on GPU. The results under different input length are given in Section 4. And this paper is
concluded in Section 5.
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2. The Principle of Privacy Amplification for CV-QKD system
Privacy amplification is one of the important steps in symmetric-key quantum cryptography by
providing an approach for Alice and Bob to distill unconditional security keys from a shared cor-
rected keys in order to securely encrypt/decrypt information. This step is realized over a classical
public channel, but it is assumed to be authenticated, so that adversary Eve can eavesdrop
on the messages exchanged between legitimate parties Alice and Bob but she can not modify
them without being discovered. Typically, privacy amplification algorithm is achieved by universal
hash families which provides information-theoretically secure for CV-QKD system. For a practical
system, the finite-size effect on the security of privacy amplification can not be ignored and the
size is related to the transmission distance, security parameter, and other factors. In this section,
we first introduce the universal hash family used in our system, then describe the finite-size
effect of privacy amplification, finally present the implementation procedure of privacy amplification
algorithm.
2.1. Universal Hash Families
An important application of universal hashing is privacy amplification in quantum cryptography.
A hash function is selected at random from universal hash families to extract secure keys from
corrected keys at a low collision probability. The collision probability means that different input
data have the same output keys after universal hashing. In other words, even if adversary Eve
does not have the same corrected keys as Alice and Bob, she can also have the same secret keys
with a certain probability. Thus, collision probability should be as small as possible, otherwise the
security of the secret keys can not be guaranteed. And its value is determined by three factors: the
hash function that selected from universal families, the input length and the output length of the
hash function. Different hash functions have different implementation complexity. Thus, choosing
a hash function with low collision probability and low complexity is of great significance to the
security and the speed of privacy amplification for CV-QKD system.
Toeplitz matrix is one of the universal hash functions, it is also called diagonal-constant matrix
which means that the element on a diagonal line from the upper left to the lower right of the matrix
is constant. Therefore, all elements of the whole matrix are determined as long as the elements
of the first column and the first row of the matrix are determined. For instance, Eq. (1) is a Toeplitz
matrix.
T =


t0 tn tn+1 · · · · · · t2n−2
t1 t0 tn
. . .
...
t2 t1
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . . tn tn+1
...
. . . t1 t0 tn
tn−1 · · · · · · t2 t1 t0


. (1)
Eq. (1) is a square matrix of n × n. Supposing that the ith, jth element of T is denoted by
Ti,j , then the elements in the lower and upper triangular part of matrix T have the relations
that Ti,j = Ti+1,j+1 = ti−j and tj−i+n−1, 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n − 1. The degrees of freedom of Toeplitz
matrix are 2n − 1, rather than n2. Actually, the Toeplitz matrix is not necessarily square. The
collision probability of Toeplitz matrix is n · 2−m+1, where n is the input length and m is the output
length. Toeplitz matrix has low complexity, which supports high speed implementation of privacy
amplification.
2.2. Finite-Size Effect of Privacy Amplification
The finite-size effect has to be considered to guarantee the security of the final secret keys
obtained by CV-QKD systems. We mainly analyse the finite-size effect on the privacy amplification
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procedure. Assuming that x and y are the classical data of Alice and Bob after they measure their
quantum states and E is the quantum states of the eavesdropper Eve. The final secret key rate
of a CV-QKD system is expressed as follows [13]:
k = βI(x : y)− S(y : E)−∆(n), (2)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, I(x : y) refers to the Shannon entropy of Alice and Bob,
S(y;E) refers to the Von Neumann entropy of Bob and Eve for reverse reconciliation, ∆(n) refers
to the effect of finite-size on the security of privacy amplification. Its value can be calculated
by [13]:
∆(n) ≡ (2dimHx + 3)
√
log2(2/ǫ)
n
+
2
n
log2(1/ǫPA), (3)
where dimHx refers to the dimension of Hilbert space corresponding to the raw key x, ǫ is a
smoothing parameter, ǫPA is the failure probability of privacy amplification, and n is the input
block length of privacy amplification. Actually, the parameter ǫPA refers to the collision probability
of the selected universal hash functions. The parameter ǫ and ǫPA are intermediate parameters
which can be optimized to a small value that satisfies the security requirement of CV-QKD systems.
As shown in Eq.(2), the parameter ∆(n) has an impact on the final secret key rate. Generally,
the secret key rate decreases as the transmission distance increases for CV-QKD systems. Thus,
the impact is more obvious on long distance systems. In other words, it will affect the maximum
transmission distance of CV-QKD systems. To achieve high secret key rate and support long
transmission distance CV-QKD systems, the value of ∆(n) should be as small as possible. As
can be seen from Eq.(3), the input block length has a great influence on the value of ∆(n) when
other factors are fixed. The value of n should be as big as possible so that the ∆(n) will have
a small impact on the final secret key rate. However, if the block length is too long, it will be
unrealistic to implement privacy amplification directly. Thus, a compromise block length should be
selected. In the previous demonstration, to satisfy the security requirement of privacy amplification
when considering the finite-size effect, the block length are respectively required to the order of
108, 109, and 1010 when the transmission distance are about 50km, 80km, and 100km.
2.3. The Procedure of Privacy Amplification
Privacy amplification is used to extract unconditional secure keys from shared weak keys between
Alice and Bob and eliminate the information that Eve may know from the side channel. This
procedure is performed by choosing a hash function from universal families to compress the
shared weak keys and requires a classical authentication channel. As previously described, we
choose Toeplitz matrix as hash function to perform the procedure and consider the finite-size effect
of privacy amplification. We describe the detailed procedure of privacy amplification as follows.
Assuming that uA and uB refer to the shared weak keys for Alice and Bob after error correction
with length n, rA and rB refer to the final secret keys of them with length l, and T refers to the
Toeplitz matrix of size n× l. The length of strings uA and uB is obtained by considering the finite-
size effect of privacy amplification. The length of strings rA and rB is calculated by l = ⌊n× k⌋,
where k is the secret key rate.
Step 1: Alice randomly generates a uniform string of length n+ l − 1 to construct the Toeplitz
matrix T . She sends T to Bob. She calculates rA = uAT to obtain her final secret keys.
Step 2: Bob receives T from Alice. He perform the same calculation rB = uBT to obtain his
final keys.
The strings uA and uB are the same after error correction procedure except a small probability
that the error correction fails but Alice and Bob can not detect. This probability can be arbitrarily
small by performing an error verification procedure. Thus, the final secret keys of Alice and Bob
can be considered the same. In practice, an authentication is performed to further ensure the
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Fig. 1. The process of length-compatible privacy amplification algorithm. The shared weak keys and
the Toeplitz matrix are divided into p blocks. SWKi and Ti (i = 1, 2, · · · , p) represent the ith block of
them. Each of the block individually performs privacy amplification and obtains the intermediate keys.
The final secret keys can be obtained by modulo-2 addition among all the intermediate keys.
identical of the final secret keys between Alice and Bob, before using them to encrypt or decrypt
information in quantum cryptography.
3. High Speed Implementation of Length-Compatible Privacy Amplification
High speed privacy amplification is required to support real-time CV-QKD systems. The imple-
mentation speed is related to the input length, universal hash functions, implementation platform,
calculation precision, and other factors. Because the complexity of Toeplitz matrix is low, we
choose it as the hash function. GPU provides parallel computation and it is a suitable platform
to perform postprocessing procedure of CV-QKD systems. We have achieved high speed error
correction based on it. To simplify the postprocessing implementation procedure, we still implement
the privacy amplification process on it. However, the computational complexity is extremely high
when performing the long input length privacy amplification directly in software. FFT is used to
accelerate the process in our system and it can reduce the complexity from O(n2) to O(nlog2n).
It is difficult and impractical to perform the process directly when the block length is too long. On
the other hand, the calculation precision of FFT increases with the block length increases and it
affects the correctness and speed of FFT. Thus, length-compatible algorithm is proposed to solve
this problem.
The process of length-compatible privacy amplification algorithm is shown in Fig. 1. The shared
weak keys (i.e. corrected keys) are obtained by the error correction step which has been imple-
mented on GPU. After GPU-based decoding, the corrected keys are copied from device to host.
Because we perform the privacy amplification procedure on the GPU platform, the copy process is
no longer needed. In a practical CV-QKD system, to achieve unconditional secret keys, the finite-
size effect is needed to be considered. The input length of privacy amplification is long, especially
in the long distance systems. In practice, the input lengthes are respectively required to the order
of 108, 109, and 1010, when the transmission distance are about 50km, 80km, and 100km. The
length will be longer if the distance is further, and it is unrealistic to complete the whole process
at one time on a normal platform. Thus, we divide the input data, including the shared weak keys
and Toeplitz matrix (universal hash function), into many blocks, then execute them separately to
obtain the intermediate keys, finally achieve the final secret keys by modulo-2 addition among all
the intermediate keys. The shared weak keys are divided into p blocks sequentially. As shown
in Eq.(4) (The symbol “′” represents matrix transpose, and it is the same in Eq.(5)), the Toeplitz
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Fig. 2. The procedure of accelerating length-compatible privacy amplification with FFT. The shared
weak keys and the Toeplitz matrix are divided into p blocks. Each block is further divided to q batches.
SWKij and Tij (i = 1, 2, · · · , p, j = 1, 2, · · · , q) represent the jth batch in the ith block. IFFT is the
inverse transformation of FFT. Kij refers to the intermediate keys of jth batch in the ith block. The
blocks are serially performed. All the batches in a block are performed in parallel on GPU.
matrix is divided into p sub-matrices by rows, and the column of matrix is not divided. If the length
of final secret keys is long, the column may also need to be divided.
T = [T0, T1, · · · , Ti, · · · , Tp−1]
′. (4)
According to the above method, the privacy amplification of arbitrary length can be realized.
Since FFT is used to accelerate the procedure, the calculation precision must match the length.
For example, if the length of FFT is lower than 223, single-precision floating-point is enough to
achieve the correct results. However, if the length is larger than 223, double-precision or even
long-double-precision must be used, otherwise the results will be wrong. The wrong probability
increases with the increase of input length. And the speed of FFT decreases when the precision
increases. Thus, to improve the implementation speed and decrease the calculation precision, we
further divide each of the blocks (SWKi and Ti, i = 1, 2, . . . , p) into q batches (SWKij and Tij ,
i = 1, 2, . . . , p, j = 1, 2, · · · , q). The divided method of matrix Ti is shown in Eq.(5). The computing
and memory resources of GPU can not be fully utilized if the length of FFT is too short. To solve
this problem, we use multi-batches to independently perform FFT in parallel. The procedure of
accelerating length-compatible privacy amplification with FFT is shown in Fig. 2 and is described
as follows.
Ti = [Ti0, Ti1, · · · , Tij , · · · , Ti(q−1)]
′. (5)
Step 1: The length of shared weak keys is extended from n to 2n+ l− 2 by filling 0 at the end.
Similarly, the length of Toeplitz matrix is extended from n+ l − 1 to 2n+ l − 2.
Step 2: According to the input length of privacy amplification (including the length of extended
shared weak keys and extended Toeplitz matrix) and the resources of GPU (mainly refers to the
memory size), calculating the number of blocks p, then calculating the number of batches q.
Step 3: Performing FFT for each SWKij and Tij , i = 1, 2, . . . , p, j = 1, 2, · · · , q, then multiplying
the corresponding results of them, next performing IFFT on the results of multiplication, finally
the results of IFFT from the nth to (n+ k − 1)th are chosen as the intermediate keys Kij of the
current batch. The purpose of this step is to calculate all the intermediate keys Kij by using FFT
and IFFT. The result of Kij is:
kij = SWKij × Tij . (6)
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TABLE I
THE SPEED OF PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION UNDER DIFFERENT INPUT LENGTH.
Input Batch size 1Mbits Batch size 2Mbits Batch size 4Mbits
length Number of Time Speed Number of Time Speed Number of Time Speed
(Mbits) batches (ms) (Gbps) batches (ms) (Gbps) batches (ms) (Gbps)
4 4 3.2 1.25 2 3.2 1.25 1 3.2 1.25
8 8 6.0 1.33 4 6.0 1.33 2 6.0 1.33
16 16 11.7 1.37 8 11.7 1.37 4 11.7 1.37
32 32 23.3 1.37 16 23.2 1.38 8 23.2 1.38
64 64 46.4 1.38 32 46.4 1.38 16 46.5 1.38
128 128 95.0 1.35 64 95.0 1.35 32 95.1 1.35
The final secret keys are obtained by modulo-2 addition among all the Kij .
r =
p∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
Kij mod 2. (7)
4. Results
We implement high speed length-compatible privacy amplification based on GPU, which supports
high speed and secure CV-QKD systems and can achieve high secret key rate. The speed is
related to the GPU resources, the input length, the calculation precision of FFT, etc. We analyze
the effects of these factors in different circumstances. The finite-size effect of privacy amplification
is considered to ensure the security of CV-QKD systems. Length-compatible is used to support
long input length privacy amplification and decrease the calculation precision of FFT. It is easy to
understand that the processing speed of low precision is faster than high precision. Normally, low
precision calculation occupies less resources and has a low computational complexity. However,
half-precision floating-point number is a new development of nvidia corporation, it needs a special
type of GPU to exert its advantages and is not universal to all GPUs. Although our GPU supports
half precision calculation, it can not give full play to its advantages. Not only does the processing
speed not improve but decline. Thus, we choose single-precision to perform the calculation.
Table I shows the speed of privacy amplification under different input length. The length of secret
keys is 10% of shared weak keys. In practical systems, the ratio may be a few orders of magnitude
lower than 10%, especially in the case of long distance. As shown in table I, the speed has no
relationship with the batch size and the number of batches when the input length is consistent.
When using single-precision calculation, the results of FFT will be wrong if the input length of
a batch is higher than 8Mbits, therefore we set the batch size lower than it. We can achieve
the privacy amplification speed to 1.35Gbps at different input length. The results are obtained
on a NVIDIA TITAN Xp GPU. However, for practical CV-QKD systems, the finite-size effect of
privacy amplification has to be considered to ensure the security. The input length may be over
the processing capacity of GPU, we can not perform the procedure directly. Thus, we divide the
input data into blocks that can be directly performed. And each block is divided to smaller batches
to decrease the calculation complexity and precision. The blocks are processed serially, while the
batches are processed in parallel. In fact, if the number of batches is too large or the batch size
is too long, the following batches are performed until the previous batches are finished.
In Fig. 3, we compare the privacy amplification speeds of direct implementation and length-
compatible implementation, and we also show the results of other works. The length-compatible
implementation can achieve high speed at any input length, where the average speed is about
1.35Gbps. However, only when the single-precision can be used to correctly calculate the results
of FFT, direct implementation can achieve high speed. When the input length is between 4M and
80M, direct implementation can obtain the speed to about 0.3Gbps by using double-precision. Due
to the limitation of GPU resources, we can not directly perform the privacy amplification procedure
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Fig. 3. The privacy amplification speeds comparison of direct implementation and length-compatible
implementation. The red dots represent the speeds of length-compatible implementation. The blue
squares represent the speeds of direct implementation. The experiment results between 128Mbits and
10Gbits are obtained on the same batch size with 1Mbits. We still show the previous implementation
results of other works. USTC: University of Science and Technology of China. SXU: Shanxi University.
when the input length is larger than 80M. In Ref. [25], they achieve the speeds to about 10Mbps
by using multiplication algorithm. In Ref. [24], they obtain the speed to 108.77Mbps when the
input length is 100M by using number theoretic transform to accelerate the privacy amplification
procedure, and they implement the procedure on a coprocessor. In Ref. [26], they get the speed
to 65.443Mbps based on FPGA. As shown in Fig. 3, the proposed length-compatible method can
obtain the speed over 1Gbps at any input length, which ensures the security of final secret keys
in the case of considering the finite-size effect of privacy amplification and supports high speed
real-time CV-QKD system.
5. Conclusions
We propose a high speed implementation method of GPU-based length-compatible privacy am-
plification for continuous-variable quantum key distribution system. The finite-size effect of privacy
amplification is considered to ensure secret keys extraction. The long input data is divided into
small blocks when GPU can not directly perform the privacy amplification procedure and fast
Fourier transform is used to speed up the procedure. To further accelerate the procedure, each
block is divided into smaller batches to reduce the calculation precision. The batches are per-
formed in parallel to make full use of the resources of GPU, while the blocks are performed serially.
The proposed length-compatible method can be applied to privacy amplification with arbitrary input
length. The average speed is achieved to about 1.35Gbps at arbitrary input length, which is one
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to two orders of magnitude faster than the previous implementation. The early stage of this work
has been applied to the longest field test of the continuous-variable quantum key distribution
system [12].
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